Consensus Game Acceptors and Iterated Transductions
نویسنده
چکیده
We study a game for recognising formal languages, in which two players with imperfect information need to coordinate on a common decision, given private input words correlated by a finite graph. The players have a joint objective to avoid an inadmissible decision, in spite of the uncertainty induced by the input. We show that the acceptor model based on consensus games characterises context-sensitive languages. Further, we describe the expressiveness of these games in terms of iterated synchronous transductions and identify a subclass that characterises context-free languages.
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تاریخ انتشار 2016