Difficulty of Cooperation in Iterated Multi-Prisoner's Dilemma Situation-experimental Evidence

نویسندگان

  • Kazuhito Ogawa
  • Tetsuya Kawamura
  • Tatsuya Kikutani
  • Sobei H. Oda
چکیده

It is popular that two players face with each other repeatedly in different phases [1]. Workers usually have relationship with their colleagues not only at work but also privately. Governments make negotiations on agricultural trade in addition to industrial trade. A hotel chain competes with the rival in various areas. Do these situations facilitate cooperation? What kind of decision makings should players offer to keep mutual cooperation in such situations? Using the laboratory ex ime t and simple multi –Prisoner’s dilemma, we explore the effect of the change in the number of contacts and in the payoff structure, and then the characteristics of the strategy that leads players to reach mutual cooperation. When the number of contacts increases from one to two, players face with the more complicated situation and their behavior may be different from the single contact. The change of payoff structure will also affect their behavior. In such a case, finding the decision making to facilitate cooperation may be a hint for solving real problems.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

The Role of Anticipation on Cooperation and Coordination in Simulated Prisoner's Dilemma Game Playing

We present a connectionist model for the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game. The model was validated by comparisons with human subjects’ experiments in which subjects played individually against a computer opponent. After reproducing several interesting characteristics of individual play, we used the model in multi-agent simulations of small societies in which agents interacted among each-other b...

متن کامل

INCA: A Multi-Choice Model of Cooperation Under Restricted Communication

The advantage of the iterated prisoner's dilemma as a model of interaction is its simplicity, which allows deep mathematical analysis. On the other hand, it is unrealistic to assume that there are only two possible actions, that one always knows in advance what constitutes cooperative actions, and that successive actions are independent of each other. The present work proposes an extended inter...

متن کامل

Trust in an N-Player Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

The iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (iPD) is a standard problem for the evolution of cooperation. Published work so far dealt mainly with the 2-player case, which is neither very realistic nor very relevant for applications , as societies, in a general sense, usually are made of more than two agents. We present novel results where cooperation co-evolves with trust in an N-player iPD. In doing so, t...

متن کامل

Genetic Algorithms and Evolutionary Games

Genetic algorithms (GAs) have been used widely in evolving game-playing strategies since the mid-1980's. This paper looks at a particular game | the iterated prisoner's dilemma game, which is of interest to many economists, social scientists, evolutionary computation researchers and computer scientists. The paper describes a computational approach which uses a GA to evolve strategies for the 2 ...

متن کامل

Long-term social bonds promote cooperation in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.

Reciprocal altruism, one of the most probable explanations for cooperation among non-kin, has been modelled as a Prisoner's Dilemma. According to this game, cooperation could evolve when individuals, who expect to play again, use conditional strategies like tit-for-tat or Pavlov. There is evidence that humans use such strategies to achieve mutual cooperation, but most controlled experiments wit...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2006