1444 8866 CORRUPTION , POLITICAL COMPETITION AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY John K . Wilson
نویسندگان
چکیده
There is a growing literature on the causes and consequences of corruption. A common and often unsubstantiated assertion is that countries which exhibit a low level of political competition are more likely to suffer higher levels of corruption. In this paper we examine the effects of corruption on environmental policy under varying degrees of political competition. An important feature of the model, which has been neglected in the existing literature, is that corruption may occur at different levels of government, such as the payment of bribes to politicians who determine policies, or bureaucrats who administer environmental regulations. We analyse the relationship between political competition and environmental outcomes in a model of stratified corruption and identify the benefits and limits of political competition. Our results suggest that while political competition may yield policy improvements, it cannot eliminate corruption at all levels of government. JEL Classifications: D72, D78, Q28.
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