FISSC: A Fault Injection and Simulation Secure Collection

نویسندگان

  • Louis Dureuil
  • Guillaume Petiot
  • Marie-Laure Potet
  • Thanh-Ha Le
  • Aude Crohen
  • Philippe de Choudens
چکیده

Session Chair 8:30-8:45 REGISTRATION 8:45-9:00 WELCOME NOTE Skavhaug Amund 9:00-10:00 INVITED TALK 1: Manuel Oriol (ABB), Transfering R to D: Going the Extra Mile Guiochet Jeremie SESSION 1 : FAULT INJECTION Troubitsyna Elena 10:00-10:30 9 FISSC: a Fault Injection and Simulation Secure Collection Louis Dureuil, Guillaume Petiot, Marie-Laure Potet, Thanh-Ha Le, Aude Crohen and Philippe de Choudens 10:30-11:00 28 FIDL: A Fault Injection Description Language for Compiler-based SFI Tools Maryam Raiyat Aliabadi and Karthik Pattabiraman 11:00-11:30 Coffee break SESSION 2 : SAFETY ASSURANCE Gallina Barbara 11:30-12:00 48 Using Process Models in System Assurance Richard Hawkins, Thomas Richardson and Tim Kelly 12:00-12:30 56 The Indispensable Role Of Rationale In Safety Standards John Knight and Jonathan Rowanhill 12:30-13:00 73 Composition of Safety Argument Patterns Ewen Denney and Ganesh Pai 13:00-14:00 LUNCH BREAK SESSION 3 : FORMAL VERIFICATION Waeselynck Helene 14:00-14:30 5 Formal Analysis of Security Properties on the OPC-UA SCADA Protocol Maxime Puys, Marie-Laure Potet and Pascal Lafourcade 14:30-15:00 10 A dedicated algorithm for verification of interlocking systems Quentin Cappart and Pierre Schaus 15:00-15:30 47 Catalogue of System and Software Properties Victor Bos, Harold Bruintjes and Stefano Tonetta 15:30-16:00 72 A High-Assurance, High-Performance Hardware-Based Cross-Domain System David Hardin, Konrad Slind, Mark Bortz, James Potts and Scott Owens SESSION 4 : Fast Abstracts 60'' Guiochet Jeremie 16:00-17 :00 Fast abstracts to be announced / Coffee break 17:00:17:30 18:00-20:30 Social Events

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تاریخ انتشار 2016