Taxation and the Household
نویسندگان
چکیده
Previous analyses of demand systems and the welfare effects of taxing male and female labour supplies suppress the analysis of household resource allocation by assuming a household utility function. This paper shows that this is only permissible if the household allocates income exactly in accordance with the distributional parameters of the usual kind of individualistic social welfare function. To analyse the implications of assuming this is not the case, we construct a simple but fairly general model of household resource allocation and use the properties of the equilibrium of this model to characterise the effects of tax policy on individual utilities, as determined by the household resource allocation process.
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