What the Skeptic Still Can’t Learn from How We Use the Word ‘Know’

Since its publication more than twenty years ago, Barry Stroud’s The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism has been widely read and discussed by philosophers who are interested in skepticism about our knowledge of the external world.1 Some of his later writings on the topic (such as Stroud (1989) and (1994)) are considered essential reading too. This does not, however, mean that what Stroud says about skepticism2 has as much impact on the discussion of skepticism as it deserves. It seems that his insights into the nature of skepticism have been largely misunderstood or missed. Although Stroud has never argued for skepticism or claimed that skepticism is true, he has been referred to as a “contemporary skeptic” (Huemer, 2001, p.37). The main theme of The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism is, as the title says so clearly and loudly, that skepticism is philosophically significant and should be considered seriously, but skepticism is still felt by most philosophers, including those who write about the topic and related issues, “to be even less worthy of serious consideration than, say Ptolemaic astronomy or the account of creation in the book of Genesis” (Stroud, 1977, p.39).3 One way of taking skepticism seriously is to see it as a real threat to human knowledge of the world;4 philosophers who discuss skepticism do not necessarily take skepticism seriously in this way.5 A widespread attitude among philosophers towards skepticism is that it presents us with