Embodying the Mind and Representing the Body

Does the existence of body representations undermine the explanatory role of the body? Or do certain types of representation depend so closely upon the body that their involvement in a cognitive task implicates the body itself? In the introduction of this special issue we explore lines of tension and complement that might hold between the notions of embodiment and body representations, which remain too often neglected or obscure. To do so, we distinguish two conceptions of embodiment that either put weight on the explanatory role of the body itself or body representations. We further analyse how and to what extent body representations can be said to be embodied. Finally, we give an overview of the full volume articulated around foundational issues (How should we define the notion of embodiment? To what extent and in what sense is embodiment compatible with representationalism? To what extent and in what sense are sensorimotor approaches similar to behaviourism?) and their applications in several cognitive domains (perception, concepts, selfhood, social cognition). Cognitive science of the last 20 years has seen an increasing focus on the body. Embodied cognitive science has become an industry. However, its unity is questionable (Clark 2008a, b), and its status as a competitor or ancestor to traditional cognitive science is unclear (for divergent views compare Thagard 2005; Varela et al. 1991). Still, a worry shared by many is that classical cognitive science puts too much of the mind’s cognitive resources in the head. In its most radical form, this worry leads to a Rev.Phil.Psych. DOI 10.1007/s13164-012-0085-4 This work was supported by a grant from the Volkswagen Foundation’s European Platform for Life Sciences, Mind Sciences & the Humanities (ref. 85 639). A. J. T. Alsmith (*) Centre for Subjectivity Research (cfs.ku.dk), University of Copenhagen, Njalsgade 140-142, 2300 Copenhagen, Denmark e-mail: [email protected] F. de Vignemont Institut Jean Nicod, CNRS–ENS–EHESS, 29 rue d’Ulm, 75005 Paris, France e-mail: [email protected] ijn _0 06 86 10 7, v er si on 1 7 Ap r 2 01 2 Author manuscript, published in "Review of Philosophy and Psychology (2012) 1-13"