Ex-post stability of Bayes-Nash equilibria of large games
نویسندگان
چکیده
We present a result on approximate ex-post stability of Bayes-Nash equilibria in semi-anonymous Bayesian games with a large finite number of players. The result allows players’ action and type spaces to be general compact metric spaces, thus extending a result by Kalai (2004). Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 74 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2012