Ms&e 336 Lecture 2: a Sequential Entry Game 2 Incomplete Information 2.1 One Entrant
نویسنده
چکیده
There is an incumbent firm (denoted I), and N possible entrants. At each time step, an entrant faces the incumbent in a two stage game; assume that entrants are faced in reverse numerical order, and we number the stages correspondingly: thus stage 1 is the last stage, and entrant 1 is faced last. ALl players observe all actions taken by players in the past. At stage k, first the entrant decides whether to exit (X) or enter (N ). The incumbent decides whether to accommodate entry (A), or to fight (F ). Payoffs are as follows:
منابع مشابه
MS&E 336 Lecture 11: The multiplicative weights algorithm
This lecture is based on the corresponding paper of Freund and Schapire [2], though with some differences in notation and analysis. We introduce and study the multiplicative weights (MW) algorithm, which is an external regret minimizing (i.e., Hannan consistent) algorithm for playing a game. The same algorithm has been analyzed in various forms, particularly in the study of online learning; see...
متن کاملAn Example 1.1 Complete Information Static Game 1.2 Complete Information Repeated Game
In the last lecture, we saw an example of reputation analysis in repeated interaction (a sequential entry game) with one long-lived player and many short-lived players, where the short-lived players are unsure of the long-lived player’s type. In this lecture, we generalize that analysis by giving an overview of the key results on reputation in repeated games with one long-lived player and many ...
متن کاملIT Investment Strategy of B2B E-Commerce Website with Sequential Entry
In the competitive market of B2B e-commerce website, as customer switching cost and network externality could prevent customers to switch to later entrant, the earlier entrant has the advantage to build and retain its market share. However, the declining cost of information technology (IT) over time provides the later entrant a cost advantage. In order to maintain competitive advantage, what sh...
متن کامل14 . 12 Game Theory Lecture Notes Lectures
In these lectures, we analyze the issues arise in a dynamics context in the presence of incomplete information, such as how agents should interpret the actions the other parties take. We define perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and apply it in a sequential bargaining model with incomplete information. As in the games with complete information, now we will use a stronger notion of rationality –...
متن کاملInternet channel entry: retail coverage and entry cost advantage
In this research we study how existing market coverage affects the outcome of the Internet channel entry game between an existing retailer and a new entrant. A market is not covered when some consumers with low reservation prices are priced out by existing retailers and do not purchase. In a model with multiple existing retailers and a potential new entrant, we demonstrate that when costs are e...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2007