Representing Preferences with a Unique Subjective State Space: Corrigendum: Supplementary Appendix

نویسندگان

  • Eddie Dekel
  • Barton L. Lipman
  • Aldo Rustichini
  • Todd Sarver
چکیده

Let B = {b1, . . . , bK} denote a set of pure outcomes. Let ∆(B) denote the set of probability distributions on B. Finally, let denote a preference relation on the set of nonempty subsets of ∆(B) where this space is endowed with the Hausdorff topology. Let dh(x, y) denote the Hausdorff distance between x and y. ∗Economics Dept., Northwestern University, and School of Economics, Tel Aviv University. E–mail: [email protected]. †Boston University. E–mail: [email protected]. ‡University of Minnesota. E–mail: [email protected]. §Northwestern University. E–mail: [email protected] If we let d denote the Euclidean metric on ∆B, then the Hausdorff distance is defined by

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Supplement to “ Representing Preferences with a Unique Subjective State Space : Corrigendum ”

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تاریخ انتشار 2006