Informed entry in auctions1
نویسندگان
چکیده
We examine entry decisions in first-price and English clock auctions with participation costs. Potential bidders observe their value and report maximum willingness to pay (WTP) to participate. Entry occurs if revealed WTP (weakly) exceeds the randomly drawn participation cost. While payoffs are higher in English clock auctions, we find no corresponding difference in WTP between auction formats, although males have a higher WTP for first-price auctions. Most surprisingly, in both auction formats WTP is higher when there are more potential bidders, and this difference is not explained by relative payoffs. This result is partially explained by preferences for competition. JEL Classifications: D44, D80.
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