Hutcheson's Deceptive Hedonism -forthcoming in the Journal of the His- Tory of Philosophy

Francis Hutcheson’s theory of value is often characterized as a precursor to the qualitative hedonism of John Stuart Mill. The interpretation of Mill as a qualitative hedonist has come under fire recently; some have argued that he is, in fact, a hedonist of no variety at all.1 Others have argued that his hedonism is as non-qualitative as Bentham’s.2 The purpose of this essay is not to critically engage the various interpretations of Mill’s value theory. Rather, I hope to show that Hutcheson should not be read as a qualitative hedonist. The evidence for Hutcheson as a qualitative hedonist is strong and striking. The most commonly cited passages are taken from his posthumous opus A System of Moral Philosophy. However, a closer look at Hutcheson’s moral psychology, including his account of the interplay between pleasure and the moral and evaluative senses, shows that Hutcheson’s hedonism is best read quantitatively. Hutcheson’s hedonism is for that reason deceptive, and deceptively simple.