The Reincarnation of Cocom: Explaining Post-cold War Export Controls

The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and DualUse Goods and Technologies is the first post-Cold War export control regime. This article explains the regime’s emergence and implications in terms of three contending theories of international relations: realism, neoliberalism, and constructivism. More specifically, it addresses the question of why the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom), which was established during the Cold War, was replaced by an organization taking Wassenaar’s form, and what this tells us about postCold War international security cooperation. I argue that Wassenaar’s structure is due to a combination of factors emphasized by each of the three major theories, respectively: security concerns, self-interested bargaining among states, and norms of appropriate state behavior in the international community. The role of the latter, which is highlighted by constructivist international relations theory, has traditionally received the least attention but holds important implications for security regimes. In particular, it suggests that closer transgovernmental working relationships among export control personnel can help establish organizational cultures and practices that promote effectiveness in national export control agencies. Such interaction can encourage both the internalization of nonproliferation norms through socialization processes and greater competence in enforcing controls. Wassenaar could provide a forum for such efforts.