Philippe G. Schyns

transmissible bet�een mammals. H��ever,� the NSABB als� states that “these scientific results als� re�resent a �rave c�ncern f�r �l�bal bi�security,� bi�safety an� �ublic health”. The analysis c�nclu�es that “because the NSABB f�un� that there �as si�nificant ��tential f�r harm in fully �ublishin� these results an� that the harm excee�e� the benefits �f the �ublicati�n,� �e theref�re rec�mmen�e� that the ��rk n�t be fully c�mmunicate� in an ��en f�rum”. B�th �r�u� lea�ers have �r�teste� a�ainst the �ecisi�n,� claimin� that full �ublicati�n �f their results ��ul� n�t create a��iti�nal risks. Ka�a�ka �rites in a c�mmentary in Nature: “I believe that the benefits �f these stu�ies — the kn��le��e that H5 HA-��ssessin� viruses ��se a risk an� the ability t� m�nit�r them an� �evel�� c�untermeasures — �ut�ei�h the risk.” Other ex�erts are n�t s� sure that there is an imme�iate benefit t� be �aine� fr�m �i�es�rea� sharin� �f the �etails,� as there is n� infrastructure in �lace that ��ul� enable anyb��y t� m�nit�r f�r the emer�ence �f human transmissible H5 viruses in nature. “Surveillance �f influenza in animals is sl�� an� �atchy at best,� an� the f�ll��-u� sequencin� �f sam�les m�re s�,�” bem�ans an e�it�rial in Nature. Even if a �an�er�us H5 virus �ith mutati�ns similar t� the �nes create� in the lab �as �icke� u� by m�nit�rin� eff�rts early �n,� it is n�t clear that this ��ul� im�r�ve �ur chances. “At �resent,� such a�vance kn��le��e ��ul� make little �ifference t� the ��rl�’s limite� abilities t� manufacture an� �istribute vaccines,�” the e�it�rial c�nclu�es. Given the hi�hly c�ntr�versial �ebate �n these �r�blems,� flu researchers have a�ree� a 60-�ay m�rat�rium �n this kin� �f research,� t� all�� scientists an� ��liticians time t� fin� safe �ays �f han�lin� such �an�er�us inf�rmati�n. They may als� �ant t� im�r�ve their c�ntin�ency �lans f�r the case that a human-transmissible H5 virus,� be it fr�m nature �r fr�m the lab,� ��es start a �an�emic.