Strengthening Admissible Coalitions
نویسندگان
چکیده
We develop a criterion for coalition formation among goal-directed agents, the indecomposable do-ut-des property. The indecomposable do-ut-des property refines the do-ut-des property (literally give to get) by considering the fact that agents prefer to form coalitions whose components cannot be formed independently. A formal description of this property is provided as well as an analysis of algorithms and their complexity.
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