Toward Understanding the Dynamics of Bidder Behavior in Continuous Combinatorial Auctions: Agent-Based Simulation Approach

نویسندگان

  • Ali Mahdavi Adeli
  • Gediminas Adomavicius
  • Alok Gupta
چکیده

Combinatorial auctions represent sophisticated market mechanisms that are becoming increasingly important in various business applications due to their ability to improve economic efficiency and auction revenue, especially in settings where participants tend to exhibit more complex user preferences and valuations. While recent studies on such auctions have found heterogeneity in bidder behavior and its varying effect on auction outcomes, the area of bidder behavior and its impact on economic outcomes in combinatorial auctions is still largely underexplored. One of the main reasons is that it is nearly impossible to control for the type of bidder behavior in real world or experimental auction setups. We propose an agent-based modeling approach to replicate human bidder behavior in continuous combinatorial auctions and leverage our agents to simulate a wide variety of competition types, including experimentally unobserved ones that could not otherwise be studied. The capabilities of the proposed approach enable more comprehensive studies (via richer controlled experiments) of bidding behavior in the complex and highly dynamic decision environment of continuous combinatorial auctions.

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تاریخ انتشار 2017