Brutal Composition

1 Introduction According to standard, pre-philosophical intuitions, there are many composite objects in the physical universe. There is, for example, my bicycle, which is composed of various parts-wheels, handlebars, molecules, atoms, etc. Recently, a growing body of philosophical literature has concerned itself with questions about the nature of composition. 1 The main question that has been raised about composition is, roughly, this: Under what circumstances do some things compose, or add up to, or form, a single object? It turns out that it is surprisingly difficult to give a satisfactory answer to this question that accords with standard, pre-philosophical intuitions about the universe's composite objects. In fact, the three rival views in response to this question that have received the most support in the literature are (i) that there are no objects composed of two or more parts (which means that there are no stars, chairs, humans, or bicycles); 2 (ii) that the only objects composed of two or more parts are living organisms (which still means no stars, 1 The main pioneer in the field has been Peter van Inwagen. See his Material Beings, "Precis of Material Beings," and "Reply to Reviewers." Van Inwagen credits H. Scott Hestevolt with being the first present-day philosopher to raise SCQ (see below), in Hestevolt, "Conjoining." See also Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds and Parts of Classes; Hirsch, "Peter van Inwagen's Material Beings;" Horgan, "On What There Isn't;" Rosenberg, "Comments on Peter van Inwagen's Material Beings;" Persson, "Critical Study of van Inwagen's Material Beings;" and Sider, "Van Inwagen and the Possibility of Gunk." 2 For arguments that support this view see Unger, "There Are No Ordinary Things;" Unger, "Skepticism and Nihilism;" and Horgan, "On What There Isn't."