Neither the Washington Nor the Post-Washington Consensus: An Introduction*

In 1994 the World Bank and the IMF marked the fiftieth anniversary of their founding meeting at Bretton Woods. The occasion was hardly one of celebration for the two Washington institutions with which official post-war international financial arrangements are most closely identified. For, paradoxically, in the lengthy wake of the Uruguay Round of the GATT, the World Trade Organisation was looming on the horizon, signifying the long delayed but culminating success in creating the trade counterpart to the financial institutions. In contrast, the prospects and standing of the IMF and the World Bank were at their lowest ever ebb. The institutions' own activity around their anniversary was muted, introspective and defensive. To some extent, this was a consequence of what has been termed an "identity crisis". It was made up of a number of elements. The neo-liberal Washington consensus, in favour of the market and antagonistic to the state, was at its height. Yet, the institutions were clearly failing to deliver in terms of economic development and stabilisation. As de Vries (1996, p. 65) reported: