Product bundling and tying in competition∗
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper explores tying in the situation where a multi-product firm without monopoly power competes against several single-product firms. It considers two independent markets: one for a horizontally differentiated good, the other for a homogeneous good. As opposed to the widely accepted opinion that tying may be profitable only in the case of monopoly power, it is shown that under reasonable assumptions tying is profitable for the multiproduct firm even without monopoly power, and it has a negative welfare effect. Further, in certain cases all firms may benefit from bundling.
منابع مشابه
Tying and entry deterrence in vertically differentiated markets∗
This paper analyzes tying and bundling as entry deterrence tools. It shows that a multi-product firm can defend its monopoly position in one market via mixed bundling even without having a dominant position in another market. Such a strategy, however, leads to welfare losses and cannot be prevented by cooperation or a merger among rivals. This is shown in a model with two complementary goods. E...
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