Factoring out the impossibility of logical aggregation
نویسنده
چکیده
According to a theorem recently proved in the theory of logical aggregation, any nonconstant social judgment function that satis es independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is dictatorial. We show that the strong and not very plausible IIA condition can be replaced with a minimal independence assumption plus a Pareto-like condition. This new version of the impossibility theorem likens it to Arrows and arguably enhances its paradoxical value.
منابع مشابه
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عنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 141 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2008