Third-Country E¤ects in the Formation of Free Trade Agreements

ثبت نشده
چکیده

The proliferation of regional economic integration has resulted in a complex and continually expanding network of free trade agreements (FTAs). In explaining the formation of these agreements, the literature has generally focused on the e¤ect of country-pair characteristics and ignored the role of existing FTA network. In this paper we investigate, both theoretically and empirically, how third countries a¤ect nations’incentives to form new FTAs in various types of network. We …nd the e¤ect varies signi…cantly with the network architecture. Compared to an empty network where there is no FTA between countries, having an exclusive FTA with a third country raises a country’s incentives to form new FTAs but weakens the incentives of others to reciprocate. A new FTA will therefore only be jointly supported when the country with exclusive FTA partners has a su¢ ciently large market size and high marginal cost of production. In a hub-and-spoke network, however, where two countries are mutually linked to a third country, the existence of the mutual FTA partner raises both nations’incentives to form an agreement leading to an unambiguous increase in the probability of jointly supported FTAs.

منابع مشابه

Third-country effects on the formation of free trade agreements ¬リニ

a r t i c l e i n f o The recent proliferation of free trade agreements (FTAs) has resulted in an increasingly complex network of preferential trading relationships. The economics literature has generally examined the formation of FTAs as a function of the participating countries' economic characteristics alone. In this paper, we show both theoretically and empirically that the decision to ente...

متن کامل

Endogenous formation of free trade agreements in vertically related markets

We study the endogenous formation of free trade agreements (FTAs) in a symmetric three-country model with vertically related markets characterized by Cournot competition. We analyze the coalition-proof Nash equilibria in an FTA formation game in which each country forms an FTA with one, both, or none of its trading partners. We show that multilateral free trade is the unique stable equilibrium ...

متن کامل

Free-Trade Areas and Welfare: An Equilibrium Analysis

This paper examines the welfare effects of the formation of a free-trade area (a set of countries which abolish tariffs among member countries but let individual countries to set external tariffs). If a representative consumer has love-of-variety preferences, the welfare function exhibits supermodularity in external tariffs: when a country is constrained to charge lower tariffs on imports of so...

متن کامل

On the Relationship between Preferential and Multilateral Trade Agreements

In this paper we study the consequences of regional free trade agreements (FTAs) for global free trade. In the context of a three-country, two-good general equilibrium trade model, we derive stable Nash equilibria of two coalition formation games of trade liberalization: One in which FTAs are ruled out, and another in which countries have the option to form FTAs. Our analysis reveals that there...

متن کامل

Global Supply Chains, Trade Agreements and Rules of Origin

Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) usually come with restrictions on the use of intermediate inputs in order for final goods to qualify for free trade. I focus on Rules of Origin (RoO), which limit expenses on nonmember country’s intermediate inputs. In a three-country FTA formation game, I introduce international trade in intermediate inputs and RoO restrictions. In the case of symmetric countries, ...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

متن کامل
عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2008