Neural Correlates Underlying Action-intention and Aim-intention

In this paper we present a theoretical analysis of recent neuroscientific evidence for different neural activations underlying “action-intention” and “aim-intention”. As regards action-intention, it is shown that recognizing the actionintentions of others is based, at least in part, on the same mechanisms that underlie one’s own action-intention. In contrast, a specific area of activation was found to correlate with social aim-intention, a special case of aim-intention related to acting together. This result suggests that the distinction between I-mode (viz. “private” mode) and wemode (viz. “group” mode) intention is relevant also at the neuroscientific level of analysis. Intentional Action, Action-intention, Aim-intention People normally distinguish between “intentional” and “unintentional” behavior, and this distinction applies not only to self-initiated actions, but also to other people’s actions. By observing people acting, we can usually say what they doing and what their goals are (Baldwin & Baird, 2001). We can frequently even imagine why they are acting. If agents have this capacity, it must supervene on their brain activities. Thus, the question is to know which specific neural processes enable it. The topic of this paper is the investigation of the neural processes underlying one’s own intentional action and the observation of others’ action. How do we understand other people’s intentional actions? What is the relation, in neural terms, between action and intention and what is the neural basis of intention? How do we impute intention on the basis of action? In order to address these questions we need first to introduce some relevant conceptual distinctions. We assume that an action is a behavior undertaken with a goal in view and partly because of this goal. Action depends for its intentionality on a relevant intention of the agent. Following Tuomela (in press), this intention can be either an “action-intention” or an “aim-intention”. Action-intention. If the intention concerns the direct performance of an action (e.g., when an agent intends to open the window), we speak of an action-intention. In this case, the agent is assumed at least to lack the belief that it is impossible for him to perform the action. This kind of intention is (direct) action-intention. At in least in this paper, action-intention will be identified with the intention to perform an action directed to a proximate goal (e.g., reaching and grasping an object). Aim-intention. An action-intention contrasts with an aimintention. Whereas action-intention is necessarily related to one’s own actions, aim-intention does not require a control condition, e.g. that the agent believes that he can alone bring about or see to it that the action comes about. An aimintention can in typical cases be rendered as “the agent intends, by his actions, to bring about a state or event E”, where E can in principle be any kind of state. An aim-intention can be either I-mode or we-mode. Intending in the I-mode just means intending purely personally (or as a private person), the relevant intention expression here being "I intend to do X", while intending in the we-mode means intending as a group member, the relevant intention-expression here being "we together intend to do X" (where X can be done together or separately by us).