Extensive Games and Common Knowledge
نویسنده
چکیده
The usual justification foc Nash equilibrium behavior involves (at least implicitly) the assumption that it is common knowledge among the playecs both that the Nash equilibrium in question will be played by all and that all playecs ace expected utility maximizers. We show that in a large class of extensive form games, the assumption that rationality is common knowledge cannot be maintained throughout the game. It is shown that this can have serious consequences on traditional extensive form solution concepts (such as Selten's (1965) notion of subgame-pecfect Nash equilibria).
منابع مشابه
Synchronic Information, Knowledge and Common Knowledge in Extensive Games
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