The Axiomatic Characterizations of Majority Voting and Scoring Rules

نویسنده

  • Vincent MERLIN
چکیده

résumé – Les caractérisations axiomatiques du vote majoritaire et des classements par points. Le cadre arrowien de la théorie des choix collectifs est suffisament flexible pour entreprendre une étude axiomatique précise des règles de vote qui sont communément utilisées dans des élections politiques, lors de compétitions sportives ou par des comités d’experts etc. comme le vote à la majorité ou les classements par points. L’objectif de cet article est de rendre compte des résultats qui ont été obtenus dans cette direction depuis 1951. Nous présentons d’abord les conditions qui garantissent qu’une règle de choix collectif est démocratique. Ensuite, nous exposons en détails deux résultats fondamentaux : la caractérisation de la règle de décision à la majorité par May, et l’axiomatisation de la famille des classements par points par Young. Par la suite, en utilisant ces résultats, des classements par points particuliers, comme le vote uninominal à un tour ou la méthode de Borda, ont aussi pu être axiomatisés. Quelques remarques sur d’autres voies de recherche et des questions ouvertes concluent l’article. mots clés – Choix collectif, Vote majoritaire, Classement par points, Vote uninominal, Méthode de Borda.

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تاریخ انتشار 2004