Comparing Axiomatic and Ecological Theories of Rationality: The Case for an Internalist Ecological Rationality

The realization in the last century that observed human behavior often deviates from the predictions of traditional axiomatic theories of rationality (henceforth “TATs”), e.g. [6],[8], has led to a revival of the philosophical problem of developing a credible philosophical theory of rationality. In particular, the concept of ecological rationality (“ECO”) has been developed as a competitor to TATs. I adopt a very general and abstract formalism, known as SCOP [2], that can provide a comprehensive representation of human reasoning as our minds interact with the outside world; I then use this formalism to define, compare, and evaluate our competing theories of rationality. I use this analysis to argue that, while ECO improves on TATs, in part by looking further into people’s minds, a truly satisfactory theory of rationality must embrace internalism, go deeper into people’s minds, and consider agents’ justification for their decisions on a still deeper level. I thus conclude by arguing for an internalist ECO.