Policy Experimentation and Redistribution: Optimality of Non-Unanimity Rules∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study conditions under which optimal policy experimentation can be implemented by a legislature. We consider a dynamic legislative bargaining game in which, each period, legislators choose to implement a risky reform or maintain a known policy. We first show that when no redistribution is allowed the unique equilibrium outcome is generically inefficient. When legislators are allowed to redistribute resources (even a small amount) and can amend the status quo sufficiently frequently, there always exists an equilibrium that supports optimal experimentation for any non-unanimity voting rule. We show that with unanimity, optimal policy experimentation is possible only with a sufficient amount of redistribution. In this sense, non-unanimity rules dominate unanimity rule. ∗We thank Joel Watson, Laura Doval and participants in the Stanford Political Economy Theory seminar, the Summer Workshop in Political Economy at Stony Brook University and the UCSD theory mini conference, for helpful comments and suggestions. †University of Nottingham ‡Stanford University
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