Unconditional Sender and Recipient Untraceability in Spite of Active Attacks

Unconditional Sender and Recipient Untraceability in spite of Active Attacks – Some Remarks

The Dining Cryptographers in the Disco: Unconditional Sender and Recipient Untraceability with Computationally Secure Serviceability

appeared in: Proceedings of EUROCRYPT'89, LNCS, Springer-Verlag Heidelberg The Dining Cryptographers in the Disco: Unconditional Sender and Recipient Untraceability with Computationally Secure Serviceability Michael Waidner, Birgit Pfitzmann Universität Karlsruhe, Postfach 6980 D-7500 Karlsruhe 1, F. R. Germany

Dining Cryptographers are Practical

The dining cryptographers protocol provides information-theoretically secure sender and recipient untraceability. However, the protocol is considered to be impractical because a malicious participant may disrupt the communication. We propose an implementation which provides information-theoretical security for senders and recipients, and in which a disruptor with limited computational capabilit...

Footprint Scheduling for Dining-Cryptographer Networks

In many communication scenarios it is not sufficient to protect only the content of the communication, it is necessary to also protect the identity of communicating parties. Various protocols and technologies have been proposed to offer such protection, for example, anonymous proxies, mix-networks, or onion routing. The protocol that offers the strongest anonymity guarantees, namely uncondition...

Multi-receiver Homomorphic Authentication Codes for Network Coding

We investigate a new class of authenticate codes (A-codes) that support verification by a group of message recipients in the network coding setting. That is, a sender generates an A-code over a message such that any intermediate node or recipient can check the authenticity of the message, typically to detect pollution attacks. We call such an A-code as multi-receiver homomorphic A-code (MRHA-co...