Pairwise epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium
نویسندگان
چکیده
Article history: Received 29 March 2013 Available online 10 February 2014 JEL classification: C72 D83 D85
منابع مشابه
Pairwise Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium1
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 85 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2014