Egalitarian Rules in Claims Problems with Indivisible Goods*
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this work we deal with rationing problems. In particular with claims problems with indivisible goods, that is, problems in which a certain amount of indivisible units (of an homogeneous good), has to be distributed among a group of agents, when this amount is not enough to satisfy agents' demands. We define discrete rules to solve those problems that involve notions of fairness similar to those supporting the constrained-equal awards and the constrained-equal losses rules in the continuous case. Axiomatic characterizations of those solutions are provided. JEL classification numbers: D63.
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