Strategic and extensive games

نویسندگان

  • Martin J. Osborne
  • Jean Guillaume Forand
چکیده

2.1 Definition The basic model of decision-making by a single agent consists of a set of possible actions and a preference relation over this set. The simplest theory of the agent’s behavior is that she chooses a member of the set that is best according to the preference relation. The model of a strategic game extends this model to many agents, who are referred to as players. Each player has a set of possible actions and a preference relation over action profiles (lists of actions, one for each player).

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تاریخ انتشار 2005