Repeated Games Played by Finite Autom Ata: a Survey'
نویسنده
چکیده
In this paper we survey the recent literature on games played by finite automata. We discuss issues regarding players' rationality, procedural costs of decision making, and cooperation among players.
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تاریخ انتشار 2010