Technical Appendix for "Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms"

Appendix for Demand Analysis using Strategic Reports: An application to a school choice mechanism (Not for Publication)

The appendix follows the organization of the paper. Appendix A describes the data sources and the cleaning process, appendix B presents technical details relevant for section 5. These include details on condition 1 and limit equilibria, details on RSP+C mechanisms and proofs of results presented in that section. Appendix C presents technical details relevant for section 6, including proofs and ...

TECHNICAL APPENDIX: Optimal Welfare-to-Work Programs

On Sequentially Cohen-macaulay Complexes and Posets

The classes of sequentially Cohen-Macaulay and sequentially homotopy Cohen-Macaulay complexes and posets are studied. First, some different versions of the definitions are discussed and the homotopy type is determined. Second, it is shown how various constructions, such as join, product and rank-selection preserve these properties. Third, a characterization of sequential Cohen-Macaulayness for ...

Extensions on "Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms"

This document establishes that the result in "Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms" is robust to a number of extensions. 1. Robustness: Longer Horizon & Alternative Degrees of Transparency We will show that our result is robust in a number of di¤erent directions. The …rst extension considers the possibility that the game lasts arbitrarily long, but …nitely many periods. The next three extensions are...

Dynamic Mechanism Design with Hidden Income and Hidden Actions: Technical Appendix

In our paper “Dynamic Mechanism Design with Hidden Income and Hidden Actions,” we develop general recursive methods to solve for optimal contracts in dynamic principal-agent models with hidden income and hidden actions. This appendix provides the detailed derivations of all recursive formulations presented in the paper, as well as proofs for all propositions. Matthias Doepke: Department of Econ...