Temptation, Self-Control, and Competitive Nonlinear Pricing
نویسندگان
چکیده
Standard pricing theories consider consumers without temptation. With temptation and costly self-control, consumers dislike choice sets with tempting alternatives. We study firms’ strategy against such consumers, using Gul–Pesendorfer preferences and a game where firms compete by offering menus. JEL Classification: D43, L13, L15
منابع مشابه
Nonlinear pricing with self-control preferences
This paper studies optimal nonlinear pricing for a monopolist when consumers’ preferences exhibit temptation and self-control as in Gul and Pesendorfer (2001a). Consumers are subject to temptation inside the store but exercise self-control, and those foreseeing large self-control costs do not enter the store. Consumers differ in their preferences under temptation. When all consumers are tempted...
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