Does Gödel ’ S Incompleteness Theorem Prove That Truth Transcends Proof ? ∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
Joseph Vidal-Rosset. Does Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem Prove That Truth Transcends Proof ?. Johan van Benthem, Gerhard Heinzmann, Manuel Rebuschi, Henk Visser The Age of Alternative Logics Assessing Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics Today, 23, Springer Netherlands, pp.51-73, 2006, <10.1007/978-1-4020-50127 5>. .
منابع مشابه
Expounding the First Incompleteness Theorem
Part 1. From Gödel 1931 to Kleene 1943 2 1. Notation and terminology 2 2. Gödel 1931: in the beginning 3 3. Tarksi 1933: truth (but not proof) 7 4. Gödel 1934: the Princeton lectures 8 5. Carnap 1934: does he prove the diagonal lemma? 11 6. Kleene 1936: general recursive functions and a new proof 12 7. Rosser 1936: strengthening the first theorem 13 8. Turing 1936, 1938: incompleteness assumed ...
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