“Take It or Leave It” Offers in Negotiations∗
نویسنده
چکیده
A bargainer uses “take it or leave it” offers to signal that he is not willing to make further concessions (commitment threat) and that he will leave the bargaining table unless his demand is accepted (exit threat). This paper investigates the impacts of these threats on rational negotiators’ equilibrium shares and behaviors in a bilateral negotiation. The threats are credible because the negotiators are assumed to have the opportunity of mimicking obstinate types—who, for some reason, are constrained to implement their threats—and to build reputation on their obstinacy. Equilibrium of the bargaining game provides interesting comparative statics results.
منابع مشابه
“ Take It or Leave It ” Offers : Obstinacy and Endogenous Deadlines in Negotiations ∗ Selçuk Özyurt
A bargainer uses “take it or leave it” offers to signal that he is not willing to make further concessions (commitment threat) and that he will leave the bargaining table unless his demand is accepted (exit threat). This paper investigates the impact of these threats on rational negotiators’ equilibrium shares and behavior in a bilateral negotiation. The threats are credible because the negotia...
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