Privatization Under Incomplete Information and Bankruptcy Risk

We study privatization under moral hazard and adverse selection. We show that if the fraction of efficient investors is either insignificant or productivity differences between efficient and inefficient investors are negligible, the government would offer a pooling contract and sell the same fraction of equity to both types of investors. The lower the productivity difference, the greater the equity stake offered to investors. On the other hand, if the fraction of efficient investors is significant or productivity differentials are large, the optimal policy consists of a dual method of privatization in which it offers two methods of privatization to outside investors. The first method consists of a sale of 100 percent equity together with a subsidy and charges higher price. Under the second option, the investor pays a smaller price but buys less than 100 per cent equity without any subsidy. Efficient investors opt for the first method while inefficient investors prefer the second. The dual privatization method screens investors and provides them with maximum incentives to invest while minimizing the risk of post-privatization bankruptcy. JEL Classification numbers. G38 , G33 , D82