A Coalitional Value for Multichoice Games with a Coalition Structure
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this paper a new model of multichoice games with a coalition structure is proposed, which can be seen as an extension of the Owen coalition structure. A coalitional value on the given model is defined, which can be seen as an extension of the Owen value. Three axiomatic systems are studied. The first one is enlightened by Owen’s characterization for the Owen value and Faigle and Kern’s characterization for the Shapley value on games under precedence constraints. The second one is inspired by Bilbao’s characterization for the Shapley value on games on convex geometries. The last one is an extension of Young’s characterization for the Shapley value on traditional games. Furthermore, the relationship between the given coalitional value and the core of multichoice games with a coalition structure is discussed.
منابع مشابه
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