Glenn R . Parker : Self - Policing in Politics

University Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher, except for reading and browsing via the World Wide Web. Users are not permitted to mount this file on any network servers. Introduction Like the wistful pursuit of the " philosopher's stone, " in other words an imaginary substance believed capable of changing base metals into gold or silver, democratic theorists have long searched for mechanisms to control their politicians. Citizens' efforts to tar-and-feather their corrupt politicians have thankfully disappeared from politics altogether, largely replaced with an unfaltering belief that scandalous acts will be uncovered and the rascals subsequently thrown out of office. Both suppositions are debatable, however. Public choice theorists have called attention to the rational ignorance of voters that makes monitoring politicians extremely costly, perhaps prohibitively so; hence, learning of the wrongdoings of politicians is problematic at best. As for turning the rascals out of office, elections have proved rather ineffective in pruning governmental institutions of their corrupt members. For a variety of reasons, voters seem reluctant to replace public officials tainted by political scandal! If elections and voter monitoring are chancy means for controlling politicians, citizens would seem to be at the mercy of their public officials. Perhaps so, but this does not mean that politicians, even rational ones, will necessarily exploit this situation; constraints on the ethical behavior of public officials could be self-imposed. This is not just wishful thinking. Individuals, especially rational ones, can be expected to behave ethically if they are adequately rewarded for doing so. For politicians , one reward for ethical conduct is a sterling reputation, which, beyond its intrinsic worth, serves at the same time as an electoral resource and a potentially attractive employee attribute if the politician should leave office voluntarily or involuntarily. Simply put, reputations can be viewed as representing investments by politicians that yield premiums in terms of electoral safety and post-elective employment. Reputations for honesty and ethical conduct don't come cheaply: Ethical conduct creates costs for rational politicians in terms of foregoing opportunities to avail themselves of the off-budget benefits of public office that are difficult to monitor. Rational politicians are unethical, therefore , because the benefits far exceed the potential or the expected costs of doing otherwise. One obvious …