Rationing problems with ex-ante conditions

نویسندگان

  • Pere Timoner
  • Josep M. Izquierdo
چکیده

An extension of the standard rationing model is introduced. Agents are not only identified by their respective claims on some amount of a scarce resource, but also by some exogenous ex-ante conditions (characteristics), different from claims (e.g., endowments, entitlements, wealth, obligations, assets). Inequalities in the ex-ante conditions induce compensations between agents which influence the final distribution. Within this framework, we provide a generalization of the constrained equal awards rule. We characterize this generalized rule by means of consistency, path-independence and compensated exemption. Finally, we use the corresponding dual properties to characterize a generalization of the constrained equal losses rule.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • Mathematical Social Sciences

دوره 79  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2016