Randomised Room Assignment-Rent Division
نویسندگان
چکیده
The room assignment-rent division problem allocates a heterogeneous set of indivisible items (e.g. rooms in a house) along with a share of some divisible item (e.g. the rent for the house), such that all items and resources are allocated without surplus or deficit, and each agent receives exactly one indivisible item. It is desirable to have envy-free outcomes but this is not possible for deterministic, truthful mechanisms. In this work we present truthful, randomised mechanisms for this problem, along with new measures of envy appropriate for non-deterministic mechanisms.
منابع مشابه
Room assignment-rent division: A market approach
A group of friends consider renting a house but they shall first agree on how to allocate its rooms and share the rent. We propose an auction mechanism for room assignment-rent division problems which mimics the market mechanism. Our auction mechanism is efficient, envy-free, individually-rational and it yields a non-negative price to each room whenever that is possible with envy-freeness.
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