Degrees of Truth , Degrees of Belief and Subjective Probabilities ∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
A number of authors have noted that if we have degrees of truth, then we should have corresponding degrees of belief—but that these degrees of belief do not behave like subjective probabilities. So should we countenance two different kinds of degree of belief? I argue that we cannot coherently do so, and present instead a formal framework in which there is a single notion of degree of belief, which in certain circumstances behaves like a subjective probability assignment, and in other circumstances does not. The framework is surprisingly neat and uncomplicated, and affords a clear picture of the relationship between degrees of truth, degrees of belief and subjective probabilities.
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