Ensuring Pareto Optimality by Referendum Voting
نویسندگان
چکیده
We consider a society confronting the decision of accepting or rejecting a list of (at least two) proposals. Assuming separability of preferences, we show the impossibility of guaranteeing Pareto optimal outcomes through anonymous referendum voting, except for the case of an odd number of voters confronting precisely two proposals. In this special case, majority voting is the only anonymous social choice rule which guarantees Pareto optimal referendum outcomes.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Social Choice and Welfare
دوره 27 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2006