Title: Responsibility-Alleviation and Other-Regarding Preferences with Peer Workers in Labor Markets: An Experimental Investigation
نویسنده
چکیده
A peer worker is introduced in a controlled labor market experiment characterized by unobservable effort and incomplete contracts. Workers make decisions independently and without knowledge of each others’ actions in a modified gift exchange experiment. Introducing a peer worker into an ongoing market has a negative and significant effect on effort This decrease in effort is consistent with responsibility-alleviation on the part of employees and not with otherregarding equity concerns for the manager’s payoffs. JEL classifications: D03, C91
منابع مشابه
Other-Regarding Preferences with Peer working paper
A peer worker is introduced in a controlled labor market experiment characterized by unobservable effort and incomplete contracts. Workers make decisions independently and without knowledge of each others’ actions in a modified gift exchange experiment. Introducing a peer worker into an ongoing market has a negative and significant effect on effort provided in contrast to prior experimental stu...
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