A Utilitarian Theory of Political Legitimacy

Although the burgeoning discipline of welfare economics is based on essentially utilititarian principles, the foundations of utilitarianism have received little attention in recent years. This paper seeks to reopen the debate by drawing a distinction between Harsanyi’s two defences of utilitarianism, labeling the first a teleological or ideal-observer theory, and the second a nonteleological theory. It is argued that the modern consensus on political legitimacy requires a theory of the second type. The organizational role of the state is seen as being to enforce the laws that the people would make for themselves under ideally fair circumstances. Harsanyi’s nonteleological argument employs Rawls’ device of the original position to determine the nature of the ideally fair compromise, and finds the result to be utilititarian. However, the Kantian principles to which both Harsanyi and Rawls appeal leave the vital question of how utilities are to be compared unresolved. This paper abandons their Kantian defence of the original position, which is seen instead as a stylized version of a fairness norm that evolved along with the human race. The empathetic preferences that serve as inputs to the device are seen as being shaped by the forces of social evolution. These forces will tend to equip everybody with the same empathetic preference, which then provides a standard for making interpersonal comparisons of utility. The ideas offered in this paper are part of a larger scheme described in a two-volume work Game Theory and the Social Contract, of which the first volume has been published by MIT Press with the subtitle Playing Fair. Chapter 2 of Volume 11 expounds the same ideas in a more leisurely style. A Utilitarian Theory of Political Legitimacy