Resolving Quine’s Conflict: A Neo-Quinean View of the Rational Revisability of Logic

A number of authors have noted that Quine seems to be of two minds regarding the rational revisability of logic (Arnold and Shapiro 2007, Haack 1974a, Dummett 1978a, Priest 2006a). Although Quine is clearly committed to the rational revisability of logic, some of his other philosophical commitments appear to rule out its possibility. His commitment to rational revisability is clear because he explicitly declares it and because at least two of his claims imply it, namely: i) the web of belief is universally revisable and ii) there are criteria for choice among logics. However, Quine’s principle of charitable translation and his change of logic, change of subject argument appear to conflict with the rational revisability of logic. I argue that upon analysis, the apparent tension dissolves, and Quine consistently holds a revisability thesis. However, Quine’s revisability thesis is weak, because it severely restricts the manner in which revision can occur. I argue that a stronger revisability thesis is consistent with the spirit of Quine’s work. Since I do not claim that the stronger thesis is present in Quine’s work, explicitly or implicitly, I call the stronger thesis Neo-Quinean. To articulate the Neo-Quinean thesis, I distinguish between: 1) logic in theory and logic in practice, 2) laymen’s logic and considered logic, and lastly 3) evolutionary revision and revolutionary revision. The Neo-Quinean thesis is that all logics are revisable in some manner or other : laymen’s practice is subject only to evolutionary revision, while considered theories and practices are subject to both evolutionary and revolutionary revision. My purpose here is to show that the Neo-Quinean view is a coherent theoretical option.