Anticipated loser regret in third price auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
Article history: Received 30 April 2009 Received in revised form 12 January 2010 Accepted 20 January 2010 Available online 1 February 2010 JEL classification: D44 D81
منابع مشابه
Measuring regret: emotional aspects of auction design
Recent research strengthens the conjecture that human decision-making stems from a complex interaction of rational judgment and emotional processes. A prominent example of the impact of emotions in economic decision-making is the effect of regret-related information feedback on bidding behaviour in first-price sealed-bid auctions. Revealing the information “missed opportunity to win” upon losin...
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