Mean-Field Learning: a Survey

In this paper we study iterative procedures for stationary equilibria in games with large number of players. Most of learning algorithms for games with continuous action spaces are limited to strict contraction best reply maps in which the Banach-Picard iteration converges with geometrical convergence rate. When the best reply map is not a contraction, Ishikawa-based learning is proposed. The algorithm is shown to behave well for Lipschitz continuous and pseudo-contractive maps. However, the convergence rate is still unsatisfactory. Several acceleration techniques are presented. We explain how cognitive users can improve the convergence rate based only on few number of measurements. The methodology provides nice properties in mean field games where the payoff function depends only on own-action and the mean of the mean-field. A learning framework that exploits the structure of such games, called, mean-field learning, is proposed. The proposed mean-field learning framework is suitable not only for games but also for non-convex global optimization problems. Then, we introduce mean-field learning without feedback and examine the convergence to equilibria in beauty contest games, which have interesting applications in financial markets. Finally, we provide a fully distributed mean-field learning and its speedup versions for satisfactory solution in wireless networks. We illustrate the convergence rate improvement with numerical examples.