NOTE THE PRESERVATION OF LIFE AND SELF-DETERMINATION On October 2,1979, Brother

On October 2,1979, Brother Joseph Charles Fox, an 83-year-old member of the Society of Mary (Chaminade High School, Mineola, N.Y.), underwent hernia surgery. During the surgery he suffered severe cardiorespiratory arrest, which resulted in diffuse cerebral and brain-stem anoxia. Brother Fox lost spontaneous respiration and had to be maintained on a respirator. His physicians concluded that he was in a "permanent vegetative state." Rev. Philip K. Eichner, president and religious superior at Chaminade High School, after consulting the only surviving relatives (ten nieces and nephews), requested removal of the respirator. Nassau Hospital refused and Eichner sought judicial relief. Three amici curiae briefs (New York State Right to Life Committee, Human Life Amendment Group, the diocesan Catholic Lawyers Guild) supported Eichner and Brother Fox's relatives. The District Attorney opposed any such relief. On December 6, Supreme Court Justice Robert Meade rendered his decision. In brief, the relief was granted—as in our opinion it should have been. Indeed, we are convinced that the appropriate decision is so clear that it need not have gone to court, and ought not to do so in similar cases. However, it is not the decision itself which is our concern; it is rather its reasoning. In his petition for termination of "extraordinary life support systems," Eichner argued that "to maintain the life support system of an unwilling patient is an invasion of his constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy." In urging the right of privacy, the petitioner was relying on two highly publicized precedents, In re Quinlan and Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz. In the well-known Karen Ann Quinlan case, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized the constitutional right of privacy and stated that it is "broad enough to encompass a patient's decision to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances." The Massachusetts Supreme Court argued very similarly in the Saikewicz case, referring to "the unwritten constitutional right of privacy