ITQs under illegal fishing: An application to the red shrimp fishery in Chile
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study an individual transferable quota system with imperfect enforcement. We apply a model of individual fisherman behavior to the red shrimp (Pleuroncodes monodon) fishery in central-southern Chile. Simulation results suggest that illegal fishing could generate a 21% increase in fishing effort, resulting in a 13% increase in catch and a 2% lower quota price in comparison with the results of a system that operates under perfect compliance. The results are sensitive to changes in the level of fish abundance, total allowable catch, and the design of enforcement to induce compliance. r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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