Feedback Stackelberg equilibrium strategies when the private label competes with the national brand
نویسندگان
چکیده
We consider a noncooperative differential game where a retailer sells her own private label in addition to the manufacturer’s brand. We assume that each brand’s goodwill evolves according to a modified Nerlove-Arrow dynamics, in such a way that the advertising effort of one brand hurts the competitor’s goodwill stock. We characterize FeedbackStackelberg pricing and advertising strategies and employ simulations to analyze their sensitivity to the main model parameters.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Annals OR
دوره 164 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2008